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Phenomena of globalization brought about by the development 
of information communication technology are beginning to 
profoundly change the traditional ways in which societies 
functioned. Signs of change are also evident in the ways in 
which diplomacy is carried out. Taking note of the changes 
taking place in diplomacy, Jonathan H. Spalter asserts that 
the development of information technology has brought about 
a new form of diplomacy called “digital diplomacy” that is 
mediated by electronics technology.1 
The wave of globalization has also affected China, where 
the vertically structured diplomatic system has begun to show 
clear signs of change especially since the 1990s. As 
demonstrated in Figure 1, China’s external relations were once 
unified under the national government, but with the country’s 
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exposure to globalization, plural channels are beginning to 
mediate between the inside and the outside of the country. As 
it has become relatively easier for ordinary Chinese to 
disseminate information to the outside world, since 
information on international society now reaches the country 
on a real-time basis, and since a number of non-governmental 
factors have come to interfere with diplomatic issues between 
state governments, the borders between domestic and 
international problems are becoming increasingly ambiguous. 
Because of these developments, the Chinese government is 
finding it increasingly difficult to take recourse to the 
monopolization of information and the manipulation of public 
opinion, which once served as the source of power for its 
diplomacy. In a multimedia age, characterized by the unlimited, 
multi-directional, and instantaneous transmission of 
information, the Chinese government must take on the new task 
of formulating policies promptly, flexibly, and efficiently 
while giving due consideration to the masses both within and 
outside the country. 
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Figure 1.   ? Traditional Chinese diplomacy 
 
 In order to tackle this new task, the Chinese government, 
on the one hand, is stepping up its transmission of information 
to the international community, following the examples of the 
United States and other advanced countries. On the other, it 
is trying to cut off the channels of communication between the 
international community and the masses inside China, while 
also attempting to stick fast to the existing framework for 
the formulation of diplomatic policies inside the country. 
This dual stance of the Chinese government is giving rise to 
a new style of diplomacy, called public diplomacy. Since the 
mid-1990s, and in particular since 9/11, the advanced 
countries including the United States and Great Britain have 
bolstered their public diplomacy by further developing their 
traditional efforts at international publicity. Although 








the American and British versions, it has some distinct 
features. 
 On the other hand, consequent upon reforms of the mass 
media, China since the early 1990s has begun to see a growing 
trend toward the formation of public opinion not only on 
internal affairs but also in diplomatic relations.2 Moreover, 
the Chinese masses, with their own public opinion about foreign 
relations, have begun to dispatch information on their own, 
making use of the Internet and other new media for communication, 
and thereby exerting influence on the Chinese government’s 
diplomatic stance and foreign countries’ policies toward China. 
This sort of “civilian diplomacy,” undertaken primarily by the 
masses, is a new phenomenon that has begun to emerge since the 
1990s, and is worthy of careful examination. 
 Both the dual stance taken by the Chinese government, 
which is aimed at bolstering the dispatch of information to 
the outside world, while maintaining the barrier of 
communications between the inside and the outside, and the 
formation of public opinion on foreign relations by the Chinese 
masses, which has the potential to develop into civil diplomacy, 
are closely related to reforms in the Chinese mass media. While 
an increasing number of studies have been undertaken recently 
on the reforms of the Chinese mass media from the standpoint 
of their effects on democratization,3 there have been few 
studies on the effects of these reforms on Chinese diplomacy. 
 5
This paper attempts to shed light on changes in Chinese 
diplomacy, including both public diplomacy and civil diplomacy, 
from the standpoint of the reforms of the Chinese mass media. 
 What are the main media that the Chinese masses depend 
upon in obtaining information? In 1998, China launched a 
project to enable “every village to receive at least Channel 
1 of China Central TV (CCTV) and one channel of a 
provincial-level TV,” with the goal of raising the coverage 
of radio and television to 91.5% and 92.5%, respectively, by 
2000. It is safe to say that in present-day China, particularly 
in the countryside where the illiteracy rate is high, 
television is quite influential. Table 1 compares the findings 
of a questionnaire survey on the main sources of information 
for people in the rural districts of the southern part of 
Jiangsu Province, including mainly Suzhou, Wuxi, and Changzhou, 
where the illiteracy rate is relatively low, and the findings 
of a survey in Shanghai, a large city.4 It is clear from this 
table that in the countryside and the large cities in the 
economically well-developed coastal area, newspapers and 
television are important sources of information for the masses. 
It is evident, in particular, that both in the countryside and 
in the large city, television is by far the most important 
source of information for a majority of people, without regard 
to differences in income levels. In the light of this fact, 
therefore, this paper places importance on television, among 
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other media. Furthermore, given the fact that the phenomenon 
known as “net nationalism” has drawn much attention both inside 
and outside China since the mid-1990s, this paper takes into 
account the fact that the Internet is rapidly coming into wide 
use in China.  
Table 1. Use of Media as Sources of Information 
 Newspapers Radio Television Internet 
Villages in southern Jiangsu Province
(multiple answers allowed) 
62.0? 35.9? 84.8? na 
Shanghai 25.0? 9.0? 58.0% 8.0? 
 
II. Bolstering the Dissemination of Information to the Outside 
World: The Start of Public Diplomacy in China 
 
The expression “public diplomacy” was first used by Edmund 
Gullion in 1965.5 The former United States Information Agency 
(USIA) defines the term as follows: “Public diplomacy seeks 
to promote the national interest and the national security of 
the United States through understanding, informing, and 
influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between 
American citizens and institutions and their counterparts 
abroad.”6 
 As is evident from the definition by the former USIA, 
public diplomacy in the United States is understood to 
encompass two kinds of activities, namely, information 
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furnishing activities (dissemination of information abroad 
and international broadcasting), and international 
educational and cultural exchange. However, it is only in the 
United States that the term “public diplomacy” is defined as 
constituting these two aspects. In Great Britain and other 
countries, it is understood in the sense of “understanding, 
informing, and influencing foreign publics.” 
 In the aftermath of the Tiannanmen Incident, which gave 
China serious concern over the international climate 
surrounding itself, China earnestly embarked upon efforts to 
bolster “foreign propaganda” in order to improve its image 
abroad. Since the end of the Cold War, the Chinese government 
has been trying to bolster its dissemination of information 
abroad by strengthening its “foreign propaganda system” and 
its system of reporting international news. This seems to have 
marked the beginning of China’s public diplomacy. 
 
1. Traditional Chinese Propaganda 
In China, the control and guidance of public opinion are 
considered as two categories: internal propaganda and foreign 
propaganda. The word “propaganda” is often used in the same 
sense as “publicity,” and seldom has a negative connotation. 
It was in 1928 that the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
published its first information bulletin for dissemination 
abroad. The Pioneer, published in San Francisco, was a 
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non-periodical magazine meant for overseas Chinese, 
publicizing the Party’s opinions and positions and reporting 
on criminal conduct committed by the Japanese Army in China. 
Subsequently the Party published the magazine Voice of China 
in Shanghai in the 1930s, and the magazine China Digest in Hong 
Kong in the latter half of the 1940s. Thus, since even before 
the Second World War, the CPC had maintained a tradition of 
publicizing its opinions and positions through a number of 
publications including these. Beginning with its encounter 
with Edgar Snow in 1936, the Party began to place importance 
on contacts with foreign correspondents, trying to publicize 
its opinions abroad through them. In the early 1940s, an 
English-language radio broadcasting station was opened in 
Yanan.7 The dissemination of the Party’s opinions abroad 
through its periodicals, selective contacts with foreign 
correspondents, and English-language radio broadcasts 
constituted the CPC’s three traditional means of foreign 
propaganda. 
After the founding of the People’s Republic, the country 
inherited these three means of publicity in their entirety. 
In the immediate aftermath of the establishment of the country, 
the entry of foreign correspondents to China was essentially 
banned, with the few exceptions of correspondents from the 
Soviet Union and East European countries.8 However, under 
instructions from Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi that “China should 
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take a more positive attitude toward foreign correspondents 
willing to visit the country,” China began to make a positive 
approach to foreign correspondents, from the time of the Geneva 
Conference in 1954. In July 1955, Zhou Enlai instructed Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Wentian and Assistant 
Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua to formulate a policy that would 
enable the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to handle foreign correspondents’ visits to China, and 
take an increasingly positive attitude toward their visits.9 
In November 1957, when West German reporters expressed the wish 
to visit China, Chen Yi suggested that by allowing their visit, 
China would be able to make use of the Western media, and Zhou 
Enlai concurred.10 Subsequently, Chinese leaders have been 
making direct contacts with specific correspondents, using the 
issue of whether visits will be accepted or not as effective 
leverage, thereby tactfully producing reports that are 
sympathetic to China and useful for its diplomatic operations. 
Looking at publications for dissemination abroad that were 
launched after the founding of the People’s Republic, the 
English-language People’s China was inaugurated in 1950, and 
the Beijing Review, a weekly magazine presenting China’s 
positions on international affairs, was launched in 1958. 




2. From Propaganda to Public Diplomacy 
After the end of the Cold War, China faced hostile 
international public opinion, coming under criticism for 
violations of human rights, and being seen as a threat to the 
international community. Seeing the need to pacify this public 
opinion abroad, China found it inevitable to change its method 
of publicizing itself to the outside world.   
 The statements to the outside world that has been stepped 
up after the end of the Cold War were public diplomacy, and 
as such had features different from those of traditional 
propaganda. First, the techniques employed by China’s public 
diplomacy in the post-Cold War era were different from those 
used for propaganda. Second, as the reform of the media began 
within the country as will be explained later, China’s 
activities to publicize itself to the outside world came to 
be carried out in the atmosphere of a somewhat tense 
relationship between the government and the mass media. And 
third, China began to target its public diplomacy activities 
to unspecified members of the general public, and tried to carry 
them out effectively under the market mechanism.  
 In the post-Cold War era, China made it a policy to carry 
out public diplomacy based on the premise of supporting the 
leadership of the party, with the following five main 
objectives: (1) more strongly publicizing China’s assertions 
to the outside world; (2) forming a desirable image of the 
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state; (3) issuing rebuttals to distorted overseas reports 
about China; (4) improving he international environment 
surrounding China; and (5) exerting influence on the policy 
decisions of foreign countries.11  
 At the National Conference on Foreign Propaganda in 
October 2001, Zhao Qizheng, Minister of the State Council 
Information Office and Director of the CPC Central Committee’s 
Foreign Propaganda Office, identified Deng Xiaoping’s “Three 
Represents” theory as the guiding principle for international 
publicity activities, and asserted that in order to create a 
favorable international public opinion, “we must from now on 
have greater awareness of the need to provide better services, 
study the needs of overseas audiences, provide them with large 
quantities of information, help them understand China better, 
and make it possible for them to make use of various 
opportunities available in China.”12 Here, a step was taken 
forward from the 1990s, making it clear that external publicity 
activities would be charged with the new task of contributing 
to the country’s economic development, in addition to building 
a desirable image of the Chinese state in the minds of foreign 
audiences. 
 Thus, building a desirable image of the state, 
publicizing China’s opinions to the outside world, and 
promoting business activities both within and outside China 
are the objectives of China’s public diplomacy in the post-Cold 
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War era. 
 Since the 16th National People’s Congress of the CPC, 
the policy of “peaceful rising” has captured attention as 
representing the new image of the state, and a large number 
of studies have been made on this policy. In reality, however, 
various efforts aimed at building a desirable image of the 
Chinese state have been carried out from the beginning of the 
1990s. According to a study by Hongying Wang, throughout the 
1990s the Chinese government strived to build an image of China 
as “a major power dedicated to collaboration with the 
international community and to the safeguarding of peace.”13  
 The reorganization of offices responsible for guiding 
external publicity began in the 1990s. In 1991, the Information 
Office of the State Council was established, and in 1998 the 
English name of the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central 
Committee was changed into the Publicity Department. In 1984, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a spokesperson 
system, with Qian Qishen being appointed as the first 
spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the latter 
half of the 1990s, other government offices followed the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ example, trying to strengthen 
their foreign publicity activities and establish news press 
systems of their own, while maintaining liaisons with one 
another. Consequently, China’s information dissemination 
activities came to be undertaken by the news press systems of 
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the Party and government offices, and by the spokesperson 
systems and publicity media at various levels of government 
offices that had been established in the 1990s. 
 The new techniques of public diplomacy that went into 
operation during the 1990s also became diversified, going 
beyond the traditional three means of periodicals, selective 
contacts with foreign correspondents, and English-language 
radio broadcasting. The government issued instructions 
demanding that foreign publicity be reinforced with the 
adoption of the following six techniques: (1) boosting 
external publicity through the Internet; (2) expanding 
external cultural exchanges by unifying exchanges and external 
publicity; (3) making the external cultural industry more 
competitive and influential, thereby making cultural 
publicity more attractive; (4) adopting a more positive 
attitude toward foreign media and reporters; (5) strengthening 
external publicity activities by studying the market mechanism 
for external publicity items, and promoting moves abroad by 
Chinese media; and (6) making concentrated efforts to 
publicize important issues on a priority basis. 
 As evident from these techniques adopted by the Chinese 
government, China’s public diplomacy in the post-Cold War era 
took on the following three characteristics. First, its public 
diplomacy attaches importance to both external cultural 
exchanges and external publicity. Second, it aims to send out 
 14
information to the outside world through the market mechanism. 
And third, China focuses on selected issues in its public 
diplomacy. These features mean that China’s efforts to 
strengthen the system of external publicity activities were 
carried out primarily by reinforcing various organizations’ 
capabilities to disseminate information abroad, and by 
boosting external publicity activities on an issue-by-issue 
basis. China has placed a special emphasis on foreign publicity 
activities on issues of international attention. In carrying 
out foreign publicity activities on “planned parenthood” in 
FY2001, the Chinese government revised its website on “China’s 
population and planned parenthood,” and issued a publication 
titled China’s Population Today on six occasions. Moreover, 
not only did the government actively respond to interviews by 
foreign correspondents concerning planned parenthood, but 
also made positive approaches to Chinese and foreign reporters, 
sponsoring two international conferences and press briefings. 
The government periodically gathered foreign media reports on 
planned parenthood in China, and offered “corrections” to 
inaccurate foreign reports through the pages of the China 
Daily.14  
 While these foreign publicity activities have had some 
effect, there are serious obstacles that remain to be overcome. 
In particular, the Chinese government has identified 
inequalities between its own information disseminating 
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ability and those of advanced countries in the 
information-oriented age (the fact that China, as a developing 
country, lags behind advanced countries technologically and 
therefore in terms of information dissemination capability), 
and its lack of competitiveness as the major obstacles to 
overcome, and has tried very hard to deal with them. 
 
3. The Mass Media as the Main Pillar of Information 
Dissemination and China’s Public Diplomacy 
Government offices of various levels and major 
organizations of the Party and the government are trying to 
reinforce their external publicity activities through such 
means as disclosure of their operations, distribution of 
publications meant for foreign audiences, news press, and 
responses to interviews by foreign reporters, the efforts to 
reinforce the external publicity activities of the Chinese 
mass media, which are performing a special role in China’s 
foreign publicity, take on aspects different from the efforts 
to boost other organizations’ external publicity activities. 
Relationships between political power and the mass media 
can be grouped into four types, namely relationships peculiar 
to the “theory of authoritarianism,” the “theory of 
liberalism,” the “theory of social accountability,” and the 
“theory of Soviet-like totaliarianism.” The mass media in 
China are now at the stage of trying to break out of the mold 
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peculiar to the theory of totalitarianism. 
 
(1) Reforms of the Mass Media: Adaptation to the Market 
Mechanism 
 Before the launch of the reform and open door policy, 
China adopted “vertical information measures.”16 In 1978, it 
began to reform the mass media under the slogan that the mass 
media should be organized as projects, and managed as 
enterprises (Shiye Danwei, Qiye Guanli). Under this slogan, 
a corporate management and administrative system was 
introduced into the media; the organizations were given 
increased discretionary powers for decisions on page layouts, 
the selection of advertisements, and pricing; and they were 
forced to become financially self-supporting. Although the 
basic characteristic of the media as “mouthpiece of the Party” 
remained unchanged, the principle governing their management 
was now changed. Consequently, television stations took on the 
dual characteristics of being partly projects and partly 
corporations.” 
 At the 11th National Conference on Radio and 
Television in March 1983, it was resolved that radio and 
television stations should strive to “expand their sources of 
revenues and improve their economic effectiveness” as part of 
the objectives of reform.17 In the “Decision to Expedite the 
Development of Tertiary Industries,” which was issued in June 
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1992 by the Central Committee of the CPC, the mass media, 
including radio and television stations, were classified as 
part of the tertiary industry, and were required to practice 
“corporate management.” Finally, at the first meeting of the 
Ninth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of 
China, the Chinese government adopted a policy of gradually 
reducing its provision of funds to organizations in charge of 
various projects, including television stations, and to 
ultimately make these organizations financially independent. 
 The “separation of ownership and management” has gone 
forward, and the government’s subsidies to the media have been 
mostly abolished, with the result that newspapers such as the 
People’s Daily, Guangming Daily and Economic Daily are now 
managed on a financially self-supporting basis.18 The reforms 
of the mass media over the last two decades have been based 
on the policy that the media should be “managed as corporations, 
and operated in the open market.”   
 In the course of the implementation of the policy to 
promote the “corporate management of project organizations,” 
Shanghai Television ran commercials for the first time on 
January 28, 1979. Three months later, on March 15, Shanghai 
Television ran the first TV commercial ever broadcast inside 
China advertising a foreign product. In November 1979, the 
State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) 
gave approval to Shanghai Television’s commercials on an ex 
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post facto basis, issuing “A Notification concerning 
Publication and Broadcasting of Commercials for Foreign 
Products by Newspapers, Radios and Televisions,” which 
approved the running of such commercials. On January 1, 1994, 
CCTV began to run TV commercials for 30 seconds during the 
thirty-minute news program of CCTV from 7:00 to 7:30 p.m. and 
the subsequent weather forecast. On April 1, it extended these 
commercials from 30 seconds to one minute. Then, in 1995, it 
introduced a “bidding” system for commercials to be run after 
the thirty-minute news program of CCTV from 7:00 to 7:30 p.m. 
 In this way, television channels and other media 
transformed themselves into a mass media industry. In terms 
of the tax payments, China’s mass media emerged as the fourth 
largest industry, outstripping tobacco. Under the 
“self-supporting accounting system” the media earn 
approximately 70% of their revenues through advertising, 
amounting to approximately 29 billion yuan in 1999, with the 
figure increasing at an amazing pace of 34.77% per year (see 
Table 2).  
Table 2. Advertising Revenues of the Chinese Mass Media (Unit: 
Billion yuan) 
? ? ????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????? ????? ????
Television? ????? ???? ???? ???? ????? ????? ?????? ??????? ?????
Newspapers? ????? ??? ???? ???? ???? ????? ?????? ?????? ?????
 19
Magazines? ????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????? ????? ???
Radio? ????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????? ?????? ????
Total for media? ????? ???? ???? ????? ????? ????? ??????? ??????? ?????
Source: Compiled on the basis of data taken from CHINA.COM.CN 
http://www.china.org.cn 
 
 Having been forced into financial independence, the 
Chinese media had to compete with one another, and the 
competition became overheated as many TV stations were 
established beginning in the 1980s. In 1983, the Department 
of Radio, Film and Television of the State Council released 
a policy on establishing TV stations. Unlike the previous 
policy that allowed the establishment of TV stations only at 
the central and provincial levels, the new policy made possible 
the establishment of TV stations at the city and prefectural 
levels as well. Following the establishment of the first 
station in Shanghai in 1985, cable TV stations were opened in 
various places. From 1994 to 2000, the number of households 
with subscriptions to cable TV jumped from 1.64 million, with 
broadcasting for an average of 439 hours per week, to 3.03 
million households and 658 hours.19 One phenomenon revealing 
the fierce competition in the TV industry is the fact that 
audience rating survey companies began to be established in 
various places around the country starting around 1996.  
 As China’s entry into the World Trade Organization drew 
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closer to fruition, the second reform objective required of 
the Chinese mass media, following the achievement of 
“financially independence,” was to beef up their international 
competitiveness. The operating revenue of CCTV in 1997 was less 
than 600 million dollars, and even the sales of the Guangzhou 
Daily Press Group, a winner in market competition, were less 
than 300 million dollars. The integration of the mass media 
began in the latter half of the 1990s with the purpose of 
improving their international competitiveness. Following the 
establishment of the Hangzhou Daily Press Group as the first 
group in early January 1996, a total of 16 press groups were 
established during the period of the Ninth Five-Year Plan. Each 
group holds total assets amounting to more than several hundred 
million yuan. Reform of the TV industry was also carried out. 
After gaining qualification in July 1997 to manage national 
assets, Shanghai Television is now in the process of forming 
an audio-visual press group encompassing radio stations under 
a unified control. The TV and audio-visual industry is 
scheduled for further integration in the coming three years. 
 It was in Document No. 82 of 1992 that the expression 
“China Media Group” first appeared in a notification issued 
by the central government. With this document, China earnestly 
embarked on a policy of reorganizing the mass media industry 
under the slogan of building “larger radio stations, TV 
stations, publicity activities, and a larger industry,” by 
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abolishing the policy of “establishing TV stations at four 
levels,” and beginning to reorganize the TV industry into three 
major stations by integrating cable TV and terrestrial TV 
stations. In August and September 2001, Document No. 17, 
entitled “Some Opinions of the Central Department of Radio and 
Television, the SARFT, and the General Administration of Press 
and Publication concerning Reforms of Press, Publication, 
Television, Radio, and Film,” was issued. In accordance with 
this document, a grouping of China’s mass media got underway, 
with the establishment of large-sized multimedia groups as a 
new goal. 
 Toward the end of 2001, China’s entry into the WTO was 
officially approved. In its statutes of participation, China 
made no agreement to open up its TV and radio industries. Under 
the existing “Regulation on the Management of Radio and 
Television” no TV or radio station is allowed to lease itself 
or sell broadcasting time. No radio or TV station can be run 
by a foreign venture, Chinese and foreign joint venture, or 
Chinese and foreign cooperative joint venture. Furthermore, 
the “Procedures for the Implementation of the Law concerning 
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment” 
explicitly specifies the press, publishing, radio, television, 
and film industries as being off-limits to foreign-invested 
companies. According to the “Regulation on the Management of 
Radio and Television,” only media organizations at the 
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provincial or higher levels have the right to produce TV 
programs; other organizations and individuals are prohibited 
from producing public broadcasting programs. Moreover, an 
application must be approved to receive satellite TV programs.  
 Following China’s accession to the WTO, the problem of 
competition between the Internet and television is bound to 
surface. Moreover, the Chinese mass media are expected to face 
new competition after the entry in the WTO. The agreement of 
China’s admission stipulates that within one year after 
entering the organization, foreign companies will be given the 
right to own up to 30% of the stocks of Chinese firms active 
in the Internet, television, radio and similar businesses in 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, and in the second year after 
China’s membership, foreign companies will be able to own up 
to 50% of stocks in Chinese firms anywhere in China.20 With 
regard to foreign investment in the publishing business, the 
agreement stipulates that import management rights will not 
be opened to foreign investment, and that within the first year 
after China’s participation in the WTO, foreign companies will 
be allowed to establish joint venture marketing companies in 
five special economic zones and eight major cities, with the 
areas expanded to provincial capitals in the second year of 
participation. Within the third year, restrictions on area, 
quantity, stocks, and form will be abolished, and the 
importation of up to 20 foreign films will also be admitted. 
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The marketing of visual software will also be allowed. 
 To mitigate the effects of the country’s participation 
in the WTO, the Chinese government has announced that it will 
implement a series of measures, including further 
reorganization of the mass media into a smaller number of groups, 
strengthening market integration power, rearrangement of the 
functions of organizations in charge of the mass media and 
reinforcement of their management, and the promotion of 
networking and digitalization.21 
 However, the government’s efforts to implement these 
measures are facing a number of serious obstacles, including 
duplicate investment, and shortages or poor qualities of 
technologies, human resources, and funds.22 At the first media 
forum held in China, in December 2002, Zhao Qizheng, Minister 
of the State Council Information Office, emphasized the 
following four points when discussing problems afflicting the 
Chinese mass media and measures that had to be taken to promote 
their development in the future: (1) the circulation or number 
of subscribers was small; (2) there were operations that were 
running deficits due to shortages of managerial competence and 
operating funds; (3) there was a need to accelerate the media’s 
movement toward the market economy, and to help readjust its 
industrial structure; and (4) the media should be encouraged 
to continue expanding their exchanges with foreign media.23  
Thus, since 1978, the Chinese government has 
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consistently promoted the mass media’s transition to a market 
economy, by taking various means to strengthen their 
competitiveness. As the movement toward a market economy got 
underway, the mass media has gradually taken increasingly 
active attitudes toward consumers, gradually leading to the 
formation of public opinion. 
 
(2) The Media’s Dilemma between “Guiding Public Opinion” and 
Serving as the “Government’s Mouthpiece” and the Requirement 
to Become More Competitive 
While the intensification of competition in the mass 
media in China gave rise to the scandalous practice of 
“reporting news for fees,” it also aroused discussions about 
the function of the mass media as part of public opinion 
maintaining a watch over the government, and actually 
encouraged the mass media to start playing that role.  
For the Chinese mass media to survive competition in the 
open market, depending exclusively on advertising revenues, 
they must supply services well adapted to the needs of consumers. 
In 1994 an opinion piece was circulated, titled “Who is the 
God of Television?” criticizing the situation where “the top 
leadership, making up 2% of the population, holds information 
on the remaining 98%, who are the masses” as unhealthy, and 
demanding that the contents of mass media reporting should be 
diversified. This document opened a lively discussion over the 
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need to build mass media for the masses of people.  
At the beginning of the 1990s, a shift began to take place 
in the domestic propaganda function, away from “propaganda and 
education” and toward “guiding public opinion.” In the present 
world, where it is impossible and impracticable for state 
authorities to strictly regulate information, China has come 
to rely on domestic publicity to perform the role of “channeling 
diversities of thoughts and opinions into correct and sound 
directions.”24 However, the reporting of news related to 
international affairs, which falls within the sphere of 
external publicity, still remains subject to strict controls. 
External and internal propaganda are expected to play 
different roles and are targeted at different audiences, but 
in reality both are undertaken by the same mass media 
organizations, including China Central TV (CCTV 9 channels), 
the China Daily, China Radio International, and the Xinhua News 
Agency. In reporting important issues, unforeseen incidents, 
and other sensitive and delicate issues, they must follow the 
unified guidance of the Party’s local propaganda departments, 
and observe the discipline on propaganda.25 When a Chinese TV 
reports on a certain event, it must first draw up a 
comprehensive reporting plan, broken down into detailed plans 
for all the specific stages involved. In performing an 
important propaganda duty, such as reporting on the Guoqing 
Jie (Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Republic of 
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China), it is customary for TV stations to draw up minute plans 
for all the pertinent programs on a day-to-day basis from 
October 1, the peak day, until October 15.26 
Each year, the Chinese government issues a series of 
directives concerning publicity and minute standards for 
reporting, and provides guidance to various news organizations 
to engage in publicity activities following these directions. 
For example, in a directive issued in 1991 under the title of 
“Several Opinions of the Central Propaganda Department 
concerning Present Propaganda Maneuvering,” it prescribed 
that reporting on developments in and about the Soviet Union 
should stick fast to the principle of being “accurate, careful, 
low-key, and moderate.”27 In 1999, the following six publicity 
campaigns were carried out under the leadership of the Party’s 
Central Department of Radio and Television: publicity about 
the 20th anniversary of the launching of the reform and open 
door policy, at around the time of the lunar New Year; publicity 
about the 80th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement of 1919; 
publicity about the May 8, 1999 Incident, i.e., the accidental 
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia; a 
crackdown campaign on Falun Dafa, an organization engaged in 
traditional Chinese breathing, which the government alleged 
to be subversive; publicity about the Guoqing Jie on October 
1; publicity about the spirit guiding the Fourth Plenary 
Session of the 15th Central Committee of the CPC; and a 
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publicity campaign to celebrate the reversion of Macao.28 With 
regard to media reporting on the May 8 Incident, the Party’s 
Central Department is reported to have specifically instructed 
news organizations to publicize the Incident in such a way as 
to “lift the morale of the people, appeal to, instead of 
inciting, their feelings, properly guide public opinion, and 
resolutely contribute to China’s diplomacy.” News 
organizations were further instructed that “the publicity 
campaign should last for a little more than one month, be 
divided into three stages,” and that “reporting should be made 
in a systematic order, focusing on ‘feelings,’ ‘reason,’ and 
‘actions,’ respectively, in the three stages.”29  
In this way, the Chinese government has always worked 
out a fine-grained policy concerning external publicity or 
reporting on issues related to international affairs. Under 
government guidance, the Chinese mass media have been required 
to place an emphasis on the bright aspects of international 
affairs, to be mindful of giving positive effects on public 
morality and thoughts as well as on the people’s scientific 
and cultural temperament, and to uphold the same political 
standpoint as the government’s. Slogans such as “democracy 
under centralized guidance” and “reporting should be centered 
around the positive aspects of things,” which are propounded 
as important components of the guiding principles, are 
dictated by the idea that “stability should come before all 
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else.” 
To ensure that the mass media do not deviate from the 
basic tone of the government concerning an international issue, 
they are only allowed to report on international news in China 
as they are reported in the international news of China National 
Radio, China Radio International (CRI), and China Central TV 
(CCTV), or as they are broadcast by the Xinhua News Agency’s 
central news. The media are not allowed to broadcast 
international news programs or special programs on 
international incidents obtained from foreign satellite TVs 
or other channels. Nor are they allowed to internally broadcast 
the Xinhua News Agency’s overseas broadcasting programs.30  
 The government and the Party of China are trying hard 
to get a thirty-minute news program of CCTV from 7:00 to 7:30 
p.m. broadcast across the country. Channel 1 in each locality 
is required to air this thirty-minute program intact every day 
in the same time slot; not only are they prohibited from failing 
to broadcast the program, or from disrupting it, but are also 
prohibited from superimposing subtitles to report other pieces 
of information, and even from running commercials other than 
those run on CCTV’s original news program.31 Hotels and inns 
are required to be able to fully receive programs of the CCTV, 
Channel 1 in their provinces, and the local Channel 1. Hotels 
with a three-star or better rating that fail to satisfy this 
condition are denied permits to receive satellite TV 
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programs.32  
Thus, the Chinese mass media find themselves facing a very 
difficult dilemma: on the one hand, they have been cast into 
a fierce struggle for existence; and on the other, in reporting 
international news, they are required to follow strict 
regulations set by the government to “guide public opinion” 
in a capacity as “mouthpiece of the government.”  
 
(3) Strengthening the International Dissemination of 
Information: System for Reporting Unforeseen Incidents 
This form of external publicity has proved effective to 
some extent, but still suffers from serious drawbacks as well. 
The government finds the asymmetry between China’s information 
dissemination capability and those of advanced countries and 
the lack of competitiveness among the Chinese mass media to 
be especially problematic, and has worked hard to overcome 
these drawbacks. With a view to beefing up the information 
dissemination capability and international competitiveness of 
the mass media, the government in 2003 began to place emphasis 
on the establishment of three systems: one for supervising and 
coordinating activities to publicize China to the outside 
world, one for disseminating news abroad, and a third for 
coordinating news reporting that can promptly and efficiently 
deal with unforeseen incidents.33 
 The new system proved effective reporting unforeseen 
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incidents in February 2003. Following the crash of the American 
space shuttle Columbia on February 1, CCTV ran a special 
newscast of the incident, interrupting regular programming. 
The Chinese media also acted promptly in reporting the serial 
bombings at Tshinghua University and Beijing University that 
took place in February of the same year. The bombings took place 
on 11:50 a.m. and 1:20 p.m., and the Xinhua News Agency aired 
initial reports on the incidents at 1:27 and 2:44 p.m., 
respectively. WWW.CHINANEWS.COM also quickly reported on the 
incidents. Subsequently, it made nearly 10 follow-up news 
reports on the bombings, including on-the-spot broadcasts, 
reports on the situation of the wounded, the government’s 
response, the causes of the bombings, and the reaction of the 
public. 
 On March 20, 2003, the Iraq War began. In stark contrast 
to the Chinese media’s total silence in the aftermath of 9/11, 
the CCTV set up a round-the-clock reporting system on the war 
on the day it began. When the time for the news program came, 
each radio or TV station, in addition to reporting on the war 
situation in Iraq, asked a panel specialists to comment, and 
sometimes hosted discussions among them, on the war’s progress 
and the international situation. With the dramatic increase 
in the quantity of reporting on international issues and with 
the dramatic improvement in the speed of broadcast of these 
reports, as many as 51.7% of the residents of Shanghai were 
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reported to be watching, listening to, or reading about the 
Iraq War for 60 minutes or more every day,34 and CCTV won an 
unprecedented audience rating. 
 What was characteristic about the reporting in China on 
the Iraq War was the tendency to adopt a humanitarian 
perspective, without discussing the rights and wrongs of the 
war itself. This reporting posture seems revealing of the 
Chinese media’s intent to survive within international 
competition by presenting a standpoint different from those 
of foreign media.35 It should be pointed out, however, that 
with this posture, it will be difficult for the Chinese mass 
media to facilitate the formation of a public opinion that can 
be shared with other countries. 
 The efforts to establish a system for coordinating news 
reporting that could promptly and efficiently deal with 
unforeseen incidents proved effective in providing coverage 
of social news and international news not closely related to 
China. By contrast, in reporting unforeseen incidents with the 
potential to damage the country’s image abroad, such as the 
outbreak of SARS, China hesitated and failed to allow prompt 
coverage. It was not until April 2003 when objective reporting 
on the outbreak of the illness began to be made in China, that 
the Chinese mass media regained the confidence of the 
international community to some extent, false rumors about the 
illness disappeared, and society began to regain stability. 
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 After the experiences reporting on the Tsinghua and 
Beijing University bombings, the Iraq War, and SARS, the method 
of controlling public opinion has begun to change into one of 
“guiding public opinion under information disclosure.”36 
 
(4) Strengthening the Dissemination of Information Abroad: The 
Foreign Media’s “Incursions into China” and the Chinese 
Media’s Expansion Abroad 
 
After joining the WTO, China will have to slacken is regulations 
on foreign media. When Shanghai TV began broadcasting Sesame 
Street beginning on February 14, 1998, it began, with the help 
of a team of researchers at Fudan University, to reproduce this 
program, now broadcast in 140 countries, into a Chinese version 
meant specifically for Chinese children.37 Today, however, 
popular animated cartoon programs from Japan, such as 
Chibi-maruko, are aired on Chinese TVs in their original forms. 
 A large number of foreign media have moved into China. 
In the print world, magazines including the fashion journal 
ELLE, are already being published in China. During 2003, 
magazines such as Newsweek, the Harvard Business Review, and 
Forbes were scheduled to start publishing Chinese editions in 
China. Newsweek was scheduled to be published in China under 
the title Newsweek Selecti.38 The Chinese editions of these 
three magazines were scheduled to appear in China not as mere 
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Chinese translations of the original English, but with 
contents re-edited for Chinese audiences and therefore 
different from the original versions. 
 The Chinese mass media also began to establish joint 
ventures with foreign media. On September 19, 2001, Star 
Television (currently STAR) was granted permission to operate 
a cable TV station in the Zhujiang area of Guangdong Province, 
and began full-fledged broadcasting on March 28, 2002. The 
cable TV has a channel for entertainment programs, broadcast 
in the Beijing dialect round-the-clock, and targeted at young 
people aged between 18 and 28. The channel had 970,000 
households as subscribers as of December 2002.39 Star TV also 
has five other channels, including Channel V and channels 
offering sports, movies, and nature/science. 
 Following Star TV, AOL Time Warner and China 
Entertainment Television (CETV) also obtained a license to 
broadcast commercial programs of CCTV in Guangdong Province, 
and together had 600,000 subscribing households as of December 
2002. This number was expected to increase to 1.2 million 
households during 2003.40 Toward the end of 2002, Star TV 
concluded a contract with the Hunan Media Group. Now, CCTV-9 
(English-language program) can be broadcast via AOL’s cable 
network. 
 Viacom’s music channel (MTV) is broadcast round the clock, 
and 70% of its programs consist of Western pop music. MTV Tien 
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Lai Tsun, a one-hour program broadcast every day, is very 
popular in China.  
 The American company Encore has been engaged since 1995 
in joint production of a one-hour program that is broadcast 
by CCTV-8 during prime time.  
 On August 26, 2001 Disney.com.cn, a 100%-owned 




 On November 19, 2002, the British firm Person established 
CTV Media, a joint venture with CCTV, with a view to offering 
educational and telephone shopping programs to 350 million 
homes through television and the Internet. 
 With the signing of a contract between CCTV and the 
American news channel CNN on November 16, 2002, enabling each 
party to use the news programs of the other, the two companies 
launched a personnel exchange and training program. 
 Beginning on September 15, 2001, a Nickelodeon program 
for children began to be broadcast, and by 2002 it was broadcast 
by more than 130 TV stations in China. An estimated 300 to 500 
million Chinese are expected to watch the program. 
 CCTV has signed mutual broadcasting rights contracts for 
programs with AOL, the British BskyB, and the French Vivendi 
Universal. Under these contracts, the three foreign companies 
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obtained rights to broadcast to Chinese hotels with three-star 
or better ratings, and within the special districts. Hotels 
with three-star or better ratings in China have only a little 
over one million rooms at present, and remain a very small 
fraction of the total number of hotel rooms in China. However, 
as of January 2003, a total of 30 channels, including Bloomberg, 
Star TV, CNN, HBO, and BBC World, have already obtained the 
right to broadcast to hotels with three-star or better ratings. 
 As noted before, foreign media have only made inroads 
into China in the areas of entertainment, culture, education, 
and sports, with news reporting still remaining off-limits. 
In fact, in 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs temporarily 
withheld BBC’s right to broadcast to hotels with three-star 
or better ratings on the grounds of a breach of contract by 
the BBC.  
 Exchanges between the Chinese and foreign media must be 
interactive by nature. For Chinese media, expanding abroad is 
an indispensable prerequisite for cultivating a cooperative 
relationship with foreign media. Because of the interactive 
principle of international exchanges in mass media, CCTV-9’s 
broadcasting abroad, for instance in the United States, has 
nearly 700,000 subscribers, and its satellite broadcasting in 
the United States also has more than 500,000 subscribers. It 
seems safe to say that the infrastructure for China’s public 
diplomacy is being prepared. 
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III. China’s Civil Diplomacy 
 
1. Maintaining the Barrier between the Inside and the Outside 
 
While trying to bolster its international dissemination of 
information, the Chinese government is also making efforts to 
maintain the barrier separating the inside and outside of the 
country. To do so, it is trying to maintain the system for 
unifying the dissemination of information abroad under its own 
control by imposing severe restrictions on the mass media, on 
the one hand, and also trying to shut out the inflow of 
information from abroad into China. 
 
(1) Control over the Reception of Foreign Programs 
At the same time, however, there have been changes in the 
method of controlling information. Previously, China used the 
method of “cutting off” the inflow of information. When 
watching satellite TV programs, it was not infrequent for 
people to see the screen suddenly become blank. When dealing 
with news reports that it found undesirable, the government 
upheld the principle that “the reporting of such news should 
either be withheld, delayed, or be made only briefly.” At 
present, the Chinese government has adopted a system of 
approvals and licenses to control information, under which it 
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“would regulate but not cut off the flow of information, and 
open up but not give the media a free hand.” There are two 
aspects to this system of approvals and licenses: it is meant 
to regulate the inflow of information from abroad, on the one 
hand, while also to control the contents of broadcasting within 
the country. 
Each year, an overall plan, including quantitative quotas, 
is drawn up for foreign programs (including those from Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) to be approved for domestic 
broadcasting within the year. Concrete programming proposals, 
examined and approved in accordance with the overall plan, are 
announced at the beginning of each year or season. Channel 1 
in each locality is prohibited from rebroadcasting foreign 
programs, and other channels are prohibited from doing so 
during prime time, from 6:00 to 10:00 p.m.42 
 “Document No. 250,” issued in February 1992, laid down 
regulations on broadcast time for foreign programs. Programs 
produced abroad, in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan were not 
supposed to be broadcast in excess of one third of the weekly 
total broadcast time of each radio and TV station. 
 Clause 9 of the “Administrative Rule concerning the 
Introduction and Broadcasting of Foreign Television 
Programs,” announced in February 1994, stipulated the 
following: “No television station should broadcast TV dramas 
or movies produced outside of the continent in excess of 25% 
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of its daily broadcasting time, and should not do so during 
prime time [6:00 to 10:00 p.m.] in excess of 15% of its daily 
broadcasting time.”43 The 1994 regulation made no mention of 
music and other entertainment programs, and in that respect 
seems to be more moderate than the 1992 regulation. 
 As for restrictions on cartoons, the broadcast time for 
such programs produced abroad is not supposed to exceed 25% 
of the total broadcast time for programs meant for juniors and 
teenagers. Each TV station is required to keep the broadcast 
time for foreign-produced cartoon programs at less than 40% 
of the broadcast time for all cartoon programs.44   
 The 2000 regulation required TV stations to keep the 
broadcast time for TV dramas produced abroad within 15% of total 
broadcast time during the prime time from 6:00 to 10:00 p.m..45 
 In addition to restricting the broadcasting of foreign 
programs, the government has been trying to strengthen the 
broadcasting of its own programs. The “Regulation on the 
Administration of Radio and Television,” which made 
improvements to the “Draft Law on Radio and Television” of 1986, 
and which took effect on September 1, 1997, stipulated that 
each station should broadcast the programs of CCTV-1 and Radio 
Beijing. 
 The “Notification concerning Further Reinforcement of 
the Administration of Advertising Publicity on Radio and 
Television,” issued on February 17, 1997, set upper limits on 
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the broadcast time for TV and radio commercials and fees for 
commercials, and explicitly specified the contents of 
commercials that could not be broadcast. It prohibited the 
broadcasting of commercials with contents injurious to the 
unity of the state, to the stability, honor and interests of 
the state, and to the unity of the nation, or with contents 
related to secrets of state, insults, obscenity, and violence 
to others, and superstitious beliefs, as well as those with 
contents prohibited by regulations. 
 In the early 1990s, a number of live broadcast programs 
made their appearance. In April 1994, a “Forum on Live 
Broadcasts” was held to discuss the question of how to manage 
live programs. Participants pointed out the dangers of live 
broadcast programs, such as the fact that rash opinions and 
opinions deviating from the official lines of the Party and 
the government might be broadcast, and concluded that it was 
imperative to reinforce the “system of supervisory monitoring” 
of live broadcast programs and to require responsible 
individuals such as department chiefs and station managers to 
be present at the scene of broadcast. The forum also concluded 
that in sensitive times, the contents of live programs should 
be recorded beforehand.46 In 1999, a new notification entitled 
“Tentative Administrative Methods concerning Mass 
Participation in Live Radio and TV Programs” was issued with 
stipulations that live programs could be broadcast only with 
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the consent of the manager of the radio or television station 
concerned and of the departments of mass media at various levels, 
that broadcast delays and measures to monitor callers should 
always be available, and that the individual in charge of the 
station producing the live program should be held responsible 
for the program.47 The latter stipulation meant that the 
responsible persons were no longer required to be present at 
the scene of production, as they were under the previous 
notification, and in this regard this notification represented 
a relaxation of the restrictions. 
 Furthermore, beginning in the latter half of the 1990s, 
the Chinese government strengthened inspection and 
supervision over broadcast programs. In 1999 the government 
began to intensify supervision over the channels of CCTV-8 on 
a priority basis, while also performing similarly strict 
supervision over provincial-level TV stations broadcasting 
satellite TV programs. In 2000, it began exercising 
supervision over the Central People’s Radio station and all 
the channels of CCTV, by recording their programs. More 
specifically, programs broadcast in the time slot from 6:00 
to 11:00 p.m. were monitored on a priority basis.48 In 2002, 
the government embarked on the establishment of “watching” and 
“listening” monitoring organizations, issuing a notification 
of its intention to reinforce its supervision and 
administration function over TV and radio programs. The 
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purpose of the stepped-up monitoring and supervisory 
activities was to ensure that TV and radio stations were not 
broadcasting programs whose contents ran counter to the 
principle concerning the guiding of public opinion, the 
principle concerning publicity, political disciplines, 
publicity disciplines, Deng Xiaoping’s thought, the “Three 
Represents” theory, that they were properly relaying the 
programs of CCTV as required, and that they were not illegally 
broadcasting foreign programs. The new notification also 
required monitoring and supervisory organizations to submit 
by the end of the first week of each month reports on the records 
of their monitoring activities in the preceding month.49   
 At present, the establishment of radio and TV stations 
is allowed at the prefectural or higher level. Stations cannot 
be established by individuals, foreign companies, joint 
ventures between Chinese and foreign companies, or cooperative 
joint ventures between Chinese and foreign companies.50 
Individual firms, organizations and schools planning to 
establish radio and/or TV stations must have their plans 
reviewed and approved by provincial authorities. These 
stations are allowed to broadcast news of the parent 
organizations to some extent, but are prohibited from 
broadcasting foreign programs. Their primary purpose must be 
to broadcast programs of CCTV and provincial TV channels, and 
are prohibited from inserting commercials in these programs.51 
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 Despite these restrictions, however, there has been no 
end to TV stations and cable TV stations broadcasting foreign 
programs without permission.52 Moreover, there are limits to 
official measures to prevent the inflow of information from 
abroad. At present the reception of foreign programs broadcast 
via satellite is approved on a license basis, but in reality 
it is easy to watch foreign programs by installing a satellite 
dish at one’s own cost. After all, China has no choice but to 
improve the competitiveness of Chinese TV stations. This is 
how things stand.   
 
(2) Elimination of Foreign Influences on Programs Produced 
within China 
Another means for maintaining the barrier between the 
inside and outside is to regulate the participation of foreign 
companies and people in the production of programs inside 
China.  
China has a very strict system for granting permits and 
licenses allowing foreigners to participate in the production 
of broadcasting programs and movies in China. Foreigners, 
meaning persons without Chinese nationality, are not allowed 
to become anchorpersons of radio and TV news programs (or to 
act as commentators on news and special news programs). When 
it becomes necessary to ask a foreigner to appear on a TV program 





2. Control over the Mass Media and Chinese Public Opinion about 
Foreign Affairs 
Unlike domestic news reporting, which is being 
deregulated, the regulations on the reporting of international 
news show no signs of being slackened. Thus, various 
organizations including the media, which are placed under 
strict regulations, have been asked to contribute to beefing 
up China’s voice in the formation of international public 
opinion. Nonetheless, the news reporting activities of the 
Chinese mass media, in the face of this dilemma, have had the 
effect of stirring up Chinese nationalism. Following the 
accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, 
Yugoslavia in May 1999, an upsurge of anti-American 
nationalism is reported to have taken place inside China. A 
review of how the Chinese media competed for greater news 
coverage at the time identifies problems inherent in the 
Chinese media that led them to inspire anti-U.S. nationalism. 
A survey of the reporting activities of papers including 
People’s Daily, Nanfang Daily, and Xinmin Evening News in the 
period from September 2001 to April 2002 finds that the number 
of articles commenting on the foreign policy, economy and 
culture of the United States remained stable on the whole, and 
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their comments tended to be rather unbiased.55 
In stark contrast, however, in the immediate aftermath 
of the accidental bombing, there was a rush of newspaper 
articles and TV news coverage on the incident. A very popular 
program of CCTV called “Focus” (Jiaodian Fangtan), which has 
enjoyed a high audience rating since its launch on April 1, 
1994, reports primarily on political and social issues within 
China. It also runs follow-ups to specific reports, and 
high-level Chinese leaders such as Li Peng and Zhu Rongji are 
reported to watch the program almost every day. When Zhu Rongji 
visited CCTV in 1998, he praised it for being the mouthpiece 
of the government, mirror of the Party, and pioneer of the 
reform.56 This program reported on the accidental bombing of 
the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade every day for three weeks from 
May 8 until May 26, 1999.57  
The Nanfang Daily, a city paper which in 2000 had a 
circulation of 500,000 and had ad revenues of 200 million yuan, 
spent 12 pages reporting on the incident on May 9, 8 pages on 
May 10, and continued to spare four pages or more for the 
incident every day for one week.58  
The Beijing Youth Daily, the most popular newspaper among 
the young people of Beijing, ran a total of 179 articles on 
or related to the United States in the week from May 8 to May 
15, 1999 – 10 articles on May 8, 25 on May 9, 22 on May 10, 
36 on may 11, 19 on May 12, 17 on May 13, 30 on May 14, and 
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20 on May 15. 
A close examination of the articles reveals that the 
number reporting on the facts related to the bombing was small, 
while a large portion were interviews with the families and 
friends of the victims. The articles were often accompanied 
by graphic photographs. By contrast, there were virtually no 
articles either reporting on making proposals for Chinese 
policy toward the United States. 
The Chinese mass media, which are required to perform 
the function of “mouthpiece of the government,” are forbidden 
from discussing external policy prior to the announcement of 
the government’s policy through the Xinhua News Agency; and 
they must compete each other for larger circulation or better 
audience ratings while facing this restriction. Thus, they 
vied with one another by presenting “new” and “different” 
reports from the standpoints of the victims and their families, 
or from the scene of the accidental bombing, and there is no 
denying that this behavior tended to inflame anti-U.S. 
nationalistic sentiment. In dealing with the mass media, China 
is following what is called a policy which places political 
reporting under strict, microscopic control, while exercising 
macroscopic control with regard to the development of the mass 
media as an industry; He Zhou characterizes the present state 
of this policy as a tug-of-war between the economic and 
political elements.59    
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The bottom line for the Chinese government is to tolerate 
the existence of capital but to not allow it to interfere with 
propaganda,60 but in the final analysis not only does this 
policy end up stirring up nationalistic sentiments toward the 
outside world, but also renders China’s public diplomacy less 
effective. As noted above, news organizations are working to 
step up the international dissemination of news by producing 
programs for external publicity and by advancing into foreign 
countries. A reporter from CCTV’s Channel 9 points out, however, 
that China’s external publicity activities carried out by the 
mass media have little influence abroad.61 Thanks to 
cooperation with overseas TV stations, CCTV’s English channel 
has 14 million households abroad as users. However, a survey 
by CCTV’s English channel found that 90% of its viewers are 
living within China, that more than 80% watch the channel for 
the purpose of learning English, and that foreign viewers make 
up only 4%.62 CCTV-9 has started advancing into various parts 
of the world, but is still weak in terms of audience rating 
and insufficient coverage of local news.63 Though it suffers 
from a shortage of funds, CCTV is unable to earn profits by 
running commercials abroad. Given the strict regulations on 
the mass media including this regulation on commercials, 
international broadcasting activities, without the ability to 
produce programs freely, have naturally become centered around 
stiff and formalized programs, and especially news on meetings 
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and conferences. As pointed out by many academics, the strict 
regulations imposed upon international programs are an 
impediment to the efforts to step up China’s external publicity 
activities and to make the Chinese mass media more 
competitive.64 Moreover, the time-consuming process of drawing 
up guidelines for regulating news reporting is preventing the 
Chinese mass media from promptly responding to unforeseen 
incidents. 
 
3. The Internet 
 
(1) Method of Administering Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs) 
The “BBS Forum for Adamantly Protesting the Outrage 
Committed by NATO,” which was launched after the accidental 
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, is said to be the 
first decisive test of the Chinese government’s policy to guide 
public opinion with the use of the Internet. 
Within one month of its establishment, it had 90,000 
posts, and on June 19, 1999, it was renamed the Strong China 
Forum (Qiangguo Luntan). In early August, full-time moderators 
were appointed, and in September an eight-member panel was 
formed. The BBS is accessible daily from 8:00 a.m. to midnight, 
and has grown to encompass 15 forums, including the one on 
Japan-China relations. When an issue sensitive to China erupts, 
the number of persons using the BBS tends to increase 
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dramatically. On March 18, 2001, the day of the Taiwanese 
presidential election, it had as many as 230,000 visitors, and 
5,680 posts were made. On the following day, March 19, the 
number of new posts increased to 6,900, and the number of 
visitors also increased to 270,000. On May 20, the day of the 
inauguration speech by President Chen Shui-bian, 7,888 new 
posts were made on the BBS, and there were more than 300,000 
accesses.65  
Through its operation of the Strong China Forum, the 
Chinese government learned how to guide public opinion on BBSs. 
The main task of the moderators/administrators of the BBS forum 
is to delete extreme opinions. Universities often manage BBSs 
in such a way as to let students sympathetic to the government’s 
position express views in favor of the government’s policy on 
the open forums, and to have them persuade those who have 
anonymously expressed anti-government views in on-line chat 
rooms.66 In view of the possibility that the excessive deleting 
of undesirable entries from a BBS can drive away potential users, 
it is considered wise “not to delete entries which do not have 
to be deleted.” Consequently, BBSs and chat rooms are regulated 
relatively leniently. 
The Chinese government is conscious of the strong 
influence the Internet could have on its management of the 
political situation. Fully conscious of the imbalance between 
English and Chinese as means of international communication 
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on the Internet, the government is trying to step up 
international publicity on its policies. At the 14th Central 
Meeting of the Chinese Communist Youth League in December 2000, 
then Vice President Hu Jintao drew attention to the effects 
the Internet could have on the youths, and gave instructions 
that strenuous efforts should be exercised to develop the use 
of the Internet as a new means of political education. 
It is also notable that in chat rooms run by the People’s 
Daily Online and other networks, experts on international 
relations under the relatively strong influence of the 
government, including researchers affiliated with the China 
Institute of International Studies (CIIS, a subsidiary 
research institute of the Ministry of International Affairs) 
and the China Institute of Contemporary International 
Relations (CICIR, a subsidiary research institute of the 
Council of State), along with retired ambassadors, hold 
periodical discussions on international affairs with Internet 
users. These activities are also performing the role of 
communicating the government’s official views to Internet 
users.  
 
(2) Internet Nationalism 
According to statistics released by the China Internet 
Network Information Center (CNNIC), there were 33.7 million 
Internet users in China in 2002. The China Youth Daily (November 
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4, 2001) predicted that by 2005, there would be 200 million 
Internet users, and that in the coming 10 to 20 years the 
Internet, as the fourth media, would grow more influential than 
newspapers, radio, and television. 
As seen from the fact that China’s foreign diplomacy is 
discussed in an Internet chat room, the Internet is offering 
an arena for the formation of public opinion concerning 
international affairs. Academic specialists on foreign 
diplomacy have long been divided into two groups, hard-liners 
and those arguing for a conciliatory policy. It is also 
undeniable, however, that the debate between the two groups 
was strongly restricted by the government’s official view. In 
other words, the presentation of points of contention through 
television, newspapers, and academic journals was subject to 
the influence of the government. On the other hand, it is also 
true that opinions disagreeing with the government’s official 
view are often expressed on the Internet in China. Moreover, 
it is not uncommon for extreme views criticizing the 
government’s foreign diplomacy to appear on BBSs and in chat 
rooms. These phenomena are manifestations of what is called 
“Internet nationalism.” 
As demonstrated by Figure 2, the number of Internet users 
in China has grown year after year. According to CNNIC’s 
statistics at the beginning of 2004, the number of Internet 
users in China exceeded 78.5 million, the second-largest in 
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the world. According to CNNIC’s statistics on the Internet 
population released in June 2003, 80% of users in China are 
young people 35 years in age or younger. Moreover, students 
at professional schools, and junior and senior high school 
students account for 83.5% of total users. In other words, 80% 
of Internet users in China are young people with mid-level 
educational qualifications. 
 


























The apparently radical manifestation of nationalist 
sentiment on the Internet represents the opinions of only a 
small portion of young people. Nonetheless, the opinions of 
this minority expressed on the Internet have grown so 
influential as to lead the public opinion of the masses, and 
to affect the Chinese government’s attitude toward foreign 
affairs. 
In dealing with the Internet, the Chinese government is 
pursuing a policy of leniency, allowing young people to use 
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it to vent their frustration. At the same time, the government 
is guiding public opinion on the Internet, and is introducing 
an Internet police force. It seems possible to say that on the 
whole these measures are not contributing to the healthy 
formation of public opinion on international affairs. 
The use of the Internet, which makes external information 
readily accessible, has the to nurture mutual trust between 
the masses in different countries, on the one hand, but also 
has the possibility of allowing ill-founded anti-American 
public opinion to be formed in BBSs or chat rooms, for instance, 
and allowing it to mushroom into a strong hard-line policy 
toward the outside world in a short span of time. The Luo Gang 
Incident of 2003 – where a Chinese listener called in to a 
program hosted by Luo Gang on a radio station in Hunan Province 
and spoke ill of Chinese people, pretending to be a Japanese 
student studying in China – seems to be symbolic of this sort 
of nationalism that can get excited easily. 
 
(3) Participation by Non-government Actors in Diplomacy 
through the Internet 
The Chinese masses have begun to take part in diplomacy 
through the Internet. A typical example was a recent “incident” 
in which a group of Chinese people from the mainland attempted 
to land on the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) Islands. 
It was on April 4, 2003 that Feng Jinhua, who had become 
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famous by spraying red paint on a statue at the Yasukuni Shrine 
in Japan, talked about the plan to land on the islands for the 
first time with Li Nan, Yin Dongming, and others, whom he had 
come to know through the Internet. The plan was postponed due 
to the outbreak of SARS, but upon learning that a group of 
Japanese had landed on the islands in May, Feng and his group 
hurriedly decided on June 15 to carry out the plan on June 20. 
They used the Internet to raise the funds to pay for the expenses 
for the venture, and over a two-month period from mid-April 
to mid-June managed to raise 92,000 yuan. They recruited, also 
through the Internet, volunteers willing to land on the islands, 
and received more than 80 application.67  
This attempt – publicity about the plan for which, a 
fund-raising campaign for which, and recruitment of volunteers 
for implementation of which – were all carried out through the 
Internet drew much attention from both within and without China 
as an epoch-making attempt by ordinary Chinese people to take 
part in diplomacy. Subsequently, the China Youth Online 
carried an article highly appraising Feng Jinhua and his 
group’s attempt, but the Chinese government referred only to 
its official position about the islands, without committing 
itself to the group’s action. 
The attempt to land on the Senkaku Islands, which was 
implemented to a significant extent by making use of the 
Internet, is worthy of attention as an epoch-making attempt 
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by a group of ordinary Chinese people to assert themselves as 
participants in foreign diplomacy. At present, however, it is 
clear that ordinary people’s participation in diplomacy is 
still limited, despite its large impact both inside and outside 
the country. Of the 92,000 yuan raised though the Internet, 
a little more than 10,000 was raised by the participants’ own 
fund-raising efforts. The number of applicants, a little over 
80 individuals, was extremely small compared with the total 
number of Internet users. Of them, only about 20 actually came 
to Zhejiang, the base for the excursion. The applicants even 
included one who volunteered out of emotional shock of a 
break-up.  
Thus, the tendency for non-governmental actors to 
participate in diplomacy using the Internet has begun to 
germinate in China, but the competence of these actors still 
leaves much to be desired.  
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
Since the early 1990s, China has been trying to strengthen its 
public diplomacy on its state image. When faced with hostile 
international public opinion, being criticized for violations 
of human rights or viewed as a threat to the international 
community, China found it inevitable to improve its external 
publicity activities. The government’s efforts to improve the 
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country’s image abroad seem to pivot around creating an image 
of China as a “country committed to international cooperation” 
and a “major power” on a “peaceful ascension.” TV stations, 
including CCTV and those at the provincial and city levels, 
are making earnest efforts to expand their activities abroad, 
report on the domestic situation in China to foreign audiences, 
and eliminate negative views of China. However, it will be some 
time before the Chinese mass media, with its lack of 
competitiveness caused by strict government restrictions on 
the media, can start winning large audiences abroad.  
As made clear by the foregoing observations, Chinese 
public diplomacy, has the following characteristics: (1) its 
infrastructure for public diplomacy, or the hardware including 
the media and institutional setups, is very well developed to 
the extent of comparing favorably with any other country; (2) 
its public diplomacy is a government undertaking for the supply 
information, which places emphasis primarily on the 
dissemination of economic, rather than educational and 
cultural information; (3) its public diplomacy is primarily 
oriented toward eliminating negative images of China, but not 
so much toward the “proactive dissemination of information”; 
and (4) it will be some time before China manages to accomplish 
its objective of showing itself to be a “soft power” and 
eliminating the “asymmetry” or imbalance between English and 
Chinese. 
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While strengthening external publicity, the Chinese 
government is also trying to maintain the barriers between the 
inside and the outside of the country. In order to prevent the 
inflow of official information through television and the 
Internet, it has established laws to restrict the inflow of 
information from abroad, and has also tried to restrict the 
activities of foreign-invested media organizations inside 
China. However, these efforts to maintain the barriers for 
blocking the inflow of information from abroad have not been 
fully successful. Meanwhile, external publicity activities 
have been undertaken by government organizations and media 
organizations of various levels. The Chinese mass media, 
including newspapers and TV stations, are faced, on the one 
hand, with the need to earn profits and remain economically 
viable, while they are also required to perform their functions 
as “mouthpieces of the Party,” on the other. In their desperate 
efforts to overcome this dilemma, the Chinese media have 
ultimately opted to compete with either other in carrying out 
sensational reporting and thereby fanning nationalistic 
public opinion about international affairs. With this sort of 
public opinion about international affairs as a breeding 
ground, China’s civil diplomacy has begun to strike roots, even 
though its influence remains very limited. One important 
factor affecting the direction in which civil diplomacy is 
likely to develop from now on will be the question of what 
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becomes of the restrictions imposed on the Chinese mass media. 
Globalization, characterized by the fast development of 
information technologies, has exerted a far-reaching 
influence on China’s foreign diplomacy. China’s public 
diplomacy and civil diplomacy are taking on features peculiar 
to China, reflecting the tense relationship between the 
Chinese mass media, which are now in the process of breaking 
out of the mold peculiar to “totalitarianism,” and the 
government of China. And China’s diplomacy has begun to change 
from the days of unilateral and vertical propaganda to a new 
era of public diplomacy. 
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